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Abstract 
This paper reports on five different models of command and control. Four different 
models are reviewed: a process model, a contextual control model, a decision ladder 
model and a functional model.  Further to this, command and control activities are 
analysed in three distinct domains: armed forces, emergency services and civilian 
services.  From this analysis, taxonomies of command and control activities are 
developed that give rise to an activities model of command and control.  This model 
will be used to guide further research into technological support of command and 
control activities. 
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1.  Four models of command and control 
The purpose of this paper is to investigate alternative models of command and 
control.  In particular, the paper presents the development of an activity model and 
contrasts this with control, contextual, decision and functional models that have been 
proposed by other researchers. The purpose of the activity model is to provide a 
research tool that may be applied to any command and control domain.  It is claimed 
that this model will enable researchers to conduct investigations into different aspects 
of command and control in a systematic manner.  The main aims of any model are to 
simplify complexity and to provide the basis for predictions of performance of the 
phenomena under consideration.   
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Four contemporary models of command and control are presented as a way of 
summing up the field.  The first is a control theoretic model by Lawson (1981), the 
second is a control modes model by Hollnagel (1993), the third is the decision ladder 
model by Rasmussen (1974) and Vicente (1999), and the fourth is a functional 
command and control model by Smalley (2003).  As there is approximately a decade 
between the publications of these models, they are probably representative of the 
changes in thinking over the past three decades, although each model only represents 
a snapshot of each particular approach. 
 
Command and control may be viewed as an information processing chain, as data 
flows between the environment, one’s own forces and the command centre.  The 
model in Figure One epitomises this perspective.  The model is rooted in the idea that 
there is some desired state that the command centre seeks to achieve.  Data are 
extracted from the environment and processed.  The understanding of these data are 
then compared with the desired state.  If there is any discrepancy between the desired 
state and the current state, the command centre has to make decisions about how to 
bring about the desired state.  These decisions are turned into a set of actions, which 
are then communicated to their own forces.  The data extraction cycle then begins 
afresh. 
 
FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
Figure 1.  An adapted version of Lawson’s model of the command and control 
process.  From: Lawson, J. S.  (1981)  Command and control as a process.  IEEE 
Control Systems Magazine, March, 86-93. 
 
 
Lawson’s model owes much to the ideas from control theory. The comparison of 
actual and desired states implies a feedback process and some form of regulation. 
Central to his model, therefore, would be the “compare” function. The feedback 
involves control of “own forces” to affect a change to the environment. The notional 
“actual” and “desired” states imply phenomena that can be described in terms of 
quantitative, discrete data; in other words it is not easy to see how the model would 
cope if the actual state was highly uncertain. Nor is it easy to see what would happen 
if the changes to the environment led to consequences which lay outside the limits 
defined by the discrete state. The model does indicate the central issue that command 
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can be thought of as working towards some specified effect or intent but suffers, 
however, from its apparent reliance on a deterministic sequence of activities in 
response to discrete events. 
 
Hollnagel (1993) developed a Contextual Control approach to human behaviour, 
based on cognitive modes, to explain the effects of the context in which people 
performed their actions. Rather than command and control being a pre-determined 
sequence of events, Hollnagel has argued that it is a constructive operation where the 
operator actively decides which action to take according to the context of the situation 
together with his/her own level of competence.  Although set patterns of behaviour 
maybe observed, Hollnagel points out that this is reflective of both the environment as 
well as the cognitive goal of the person, both of which contain variability. In the 
Contextual Control Model, shown in figure two, four proposed modes of control are 
as follows. 
 
• Strategic Control - is defined as the ‘global view’, where the operator 
concentrates on long term planning and higher level goals.  
• Tactical Control - is more characteristic of a pre-planned action, where the 
operator will use known rules and procedures to plan and carry out short term 
actions.  
• Opportunistic Control - is characterised by a chance action taken due to time, 
constraints and again lack of knowledge or expertise and an abnormal 
environmental state.  
• Scrambled  Control -  is characterised by a completely unpredictable situation 
where the operator has no control and has to act in an unplanned manner, as a 
matter of urgency.  
 
FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
Figure 2. Hollnagel’s contextual control model.  From: Hollnagel, E. (1993).  Human 
reliability analysis: Context and control.  London:  Academic Press. 
 
 
The degree of control is, therefore, determined by a number of varying interdependent 
factors.  Hollnagel considers that availability of subjective time is a main function of 
command and control - this means that as the operator perceives more time available 
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so s/he gains more control of the task/situation. The factors affecting the perception of 
available time may include: the number of goals, the availability of plans to meet 
these goals, the modes of execution of those plans and the time available.  At any 
point in time the system operator is attempting to optimise all of these criteria.  
Hollnagel’s model differs from Lawson’s, in that it does not prescribe the sequence 
and relations of command and control activities; rather it proposes contextual 
differences in the control mode.  There is some evidence to support this hypothesis.  
In a study of team behaviour in a supervisory control task, Stanton et al (2001) 
showed that the transitions between control modes were consistent with Hollnagel’s 
model. 
 
The Decision Ladder model of activity was developed by Rasmussen (1974) who 
observed that expert users were relying on a mixture of knowledge-based, rule-based 
and skill-based behaviour to conduct tasks.  Rasmussen proposed that the sequence of 
steps between the initiating cue and the final manipulation of the system can be 
identified as the steps a novice must necessarily take to carry out the sub task, as 
shown in figure three.  Studies of expert performance may then result in a description 
of his performance in terms of shunting leaps with this basic sequence.  The ladder 
can be seen to contain two different types of node: information processing activities 
(represented by the rectangular boxes) and knowledge states (represented by the 
circles).  By folding this list in half it is possible to add links between the two sides.  
There are two types of shortcut that can be applied to the ladder; ‘shunts’ connect an 
information-processing activity to a state of knowledge (box to circle) and ‘leaps’ 
connect two states of knowledge (circle to circle).  This is where one state of 
knowledge can be directly related to another without any further information 
processing.  It is not possible to link straight from one box to another, as this misses 
out the resultant knowledge state (Vicente, 1999). 
 
FIGURE THREE ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
Figure 3.  Rasmussen and Vicente’s decision ladder model.  From: Rasmussen, J. 
(1974).  The human data processor as a system component: Bits and pieces of a model 
(Report No. Risø-M-1722). Roskilde, Denmark: Danish Atomic Energy Commission. 
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According to Naikar & Pierce (2003) the left side of the decision ladder represents an 
actor observing the current system state whereas the right side of the decision ladder 
represents an agent planning and executing tasks and procedures to achieve a target 
system state.  Sometimes observing information and diagnosing the current system 
state immediately signals a procedure to execute.  This means that rule based 
shortcuts can be shown in the centre of the ladder.  On the other hand the actor may 
have to engage in effortful, knowledge-based goal evaluation to determine the 
procedure to execute; this is represented in the top of the ladder.  There are two types 
of shortcut that can be applied to the ladder; ‘shunts’ connect an information-
processing activity to a state of knowledge (box to circle) and ‘leaps’ connect two 
states of knowledge (circle to circle).  The path in which the operator moves through 
the ladder is dependant on a number of factors including; their workload, experience 
and familiarity with the current task.   
 
Smalley (2003) proposed a functional model of command and control, comprising 
some seven operational and decision support functions (six in the ovals and one in the 
box) and ten information processing activities (appended to the input and output 
arrows).  The ten information processing activities are: primary situation awareness, 
planning, information exchange, tactical situation reports, current situation awareness, 
directing plan of execution, system operation, system monitoring, system status, and 
internal co-ordination and communications.  A representation of the relationship 
between the operation and decision support functions and information processing 
activities is shown in figure four. 
 
 
 
FIGURE FOUR ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
 
Figure 4.  Smalley’s functional command and control model.  From: Smalley, J.  
(2003)  Cognitive factors in the analysis, design and assessment of command and 
control systems.  In: E. Hollnagel (ed)  Handbook of Cognitive Task Design.  
Mahwah, New Jersey: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates (223-253). 
 
 
Information about the state of the world is collected through the primary situation 
awareness activities.  The various sources of information are combined so that targets 
and routes can be defined in the planning activities.  Information about targets, routes 
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and intentions is exchanged with other forces.  The status of the mission is 
communicated through the tactical situation reports.  Current situation awareness 
activities merge information about the mission with primary situation awareness, to 
inform the planning process.  The information from this latter set of activities will cue 
the start of the activities that direct the plan of execution.  This, in turn, informs 
activities associated with the direction of system operation.  The system is monitored, 
to see if outcomes are as expected.  Any changes in the system status may lead to 
changes in the planning and the directing of the plan.  Internal and external co-
ordination and communication activities keep the command and control system 
functioning. 
 
Smalley’s model comprises an integration of many command and control activities 
with feed-forward and feed-back loops.  It has a higher level of command and control 
fidelity than the other two models.  The model suggests that ‘command’ activities (at 
the top of the figure) are separate, but connected to, the ‘control’ activities (at the 
bottom of the figure).  The activities on the right-hand side of the figure are concerned 
with internal operation of the system, whereas the activities on the left-hand side of 
the figure are concerned with interfacing with the external environment.  In contrast to 
the other three models, Smalley’s model offers high much higher fidelity for 
command and control. 
 
As stated previously, the purpose of a generic model of command and control is to 
reduce complexity, and offer outcome metrics that can detect and describe non-
random emergent properties.  Emergent properties exist where the “characteristics of 
the whole are developed (emerge) from the interactions of their components in a non-
apparent way” (Bar Yam, 1997).  The optimal generic model of command and control 
can therefore be defined as one that is sensitive enough to detect emergent properties, 
whilst containing merely ‘sufficient’ complexity to explain (and predict) these 
“widely observed properties and behaviours in terms of more fundamental, or deeper, 
concepts” (Wainwright & Mulligan, 2004; Builder, Bankes & Nordin, 1999).  
 
The product of combining command (authority) with control (the means to assert this 
authority) are the emergent properties of “unity of effort in the accomplishment of a 
[common goal]” (Jones, 1993) and “decision superiority” (DoD, 1999p. 28).  Despite 
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the militaristic undertones, the notion of command and control is generic and not 
specific to a particular domain.  An analysis of three distinctly different domains for 
command and control was undertaken in the following section of the paper. 
 
2.  Three Domains for Command and Control 
The three domains selected for analysis of command and control in our studies were 
the emergency services (i.e., Police and Fire Service – McMaster et al, 2005; see also 
Houghton et al., in press), civilian services (i.e., National Grid, National Air Traffic 
Services, and Network Rail - Walker et al, 2006) and armed services (Airforce E3D, 
Navy type 23 frigate and Army CAST brigade level exercise – Stanton et al, 2005).  It 
is the cumulative understanding of Command and Control, developed through a 
variety of domains, which led to the development of a generic model. 
 
2.1.  Emergency Services 
Two command and control application areas were analysed in the emergency 
services: the fire service and the police. 
In the UK (and several other countries across Europe), the emergency services operate 
a tripartite control structure. Major incidents, which require high-level command are 
termed Gold. Typically, these occur when the coordination of a great many units is 
required. Usually such command is not required and command can be exercised on a 
local, tactical level, which characterises Bronze command. Between Gold and Bronze, 
lies a strategic command level termed Silver. 
In order to study fire operations, observations were conducted at the Fire Service 
College. The training college provided access to command structures for ecologically 
valid exercises, without the potential risk associated with actual fires. During each 
exercise, an incident commander (the Assistant Divisional Officer or ADO) issues 
commands to the sectors being controlled. For a medium-to-large incident, within the 
Silver command level it is necessary to divide response into sectors, which can be 
either geographical (i.e., parts of the fire ground), or functional (for example, 
managing water supplies or a breath-apparatus crew). The exercises that were 
observed covered operations including the search for a hazardous chemical, fire in a 
chemical plant, and a road traffic accident. 
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Police operations were studied through observations in Force Command and Control 
(FCC) and Operational Command Unit (OCU) sites. The focus was on accidents 
requiring immediate response, that is, where suspects were on the premises or an 
incident was in progress.  In carrying out their duties, West Midlands Police (WMP) 
can cover a wide variety of incidents, ranging from assaults and robberies, to 
burglaries and road traffic accidents. FCC Emergency Call Operators prioritise 
incidents as requiring immediate, early or routine response, according to their urgency. 
Incidents that are graded as “Immediate Response” are those that require an urgent 
Police presence, usually because there is a high risk of serious injury or death, or 
where there is a good chance of an arrest if the response is rapid (i.e. when the crime is 
still taking place). When an incident is prioritised “Immediate Response”, only the 
bare minimum of details are taken from the caller by the Emergency Call Operator 
(i.e. location, nature of emergency and caller’s name), which are then passed on to the 
OCU responsible for the area where the call originated. The Operations Centre within 
the OCU in question will then review the incident priority and allocate resources to 
respond to it. In the case of “Immediate Response” incidents, WMP are required to 
attend the scene within 10 minutes.  
 
2.2.  Civilian Services 
Thee command and control applications areas were analysed in the civilian services: 
air traffic control, the rail network and the national electricity grid. 
 
Air Traffic Control is a highly evolved process based on clearly defined procedures.   
The procedures used in normal operations are based on the aircraft flight plan, which 
describes its intended route. This route includes the starting location, beacons or 
reporting points that it will pass and its final destination airport. This information 
derives from the flight data strip computer, and is presented to the controllers in the 
form of a flight progress strip by flight strip assistants.  The flight data strip contains 
coded information showing particulars about the aircraft and its route. From this 
information the controller can determine the approximate time and position at which 
the aircraft will arrive in the sector.  The UK controlled airspace is divided into 
sectors, each of which is monitored by an air traffic control team.  As an aircraft 
travels through these sectors, responsibility for controlling it transfers from one 
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ATCO to another. Making sure that aircraft pass through this airspace and take off 
and land safely is the key responsibility of ATCOs.  
 
Three scenarios were analysed in the UK rail industry. The activities under 
consideration were those involved in the setting up of safety systems required when 
carrying out maintenance of track.  Under normal conditions a signaller has the key 
responsibility for controlling train movements and maintaining safety for an area of 
railway line. This control occurs remote from the line at a control centre (a signalbox 
or signalling centre).  These can be located many miles from where activity could be 
taking place.  During maintenance, another person takes responsibility (possession) 
for an area of the line.  Communication and coordination is required to transfer 
responsibility between the signaller and track maintenance engineers. The track 
maintenance engineers also have to communicate and coordinate with various other 
personnel, such as those carrying out maintenance within their areas of control, 
drivers of trains and on track-plant which may be in the zone where maintenance is 
taking place (called the possession), and personnel implementing aspects of the 
possession (all of which may also be dispersed over a certain geographical area).  
Three specific maintenance scenarios analysed were: planned maintenance (the 
processes and activities for setting up a possession for a stretch of track so that 
planned maintenance can take place), emergency engineering work (the processes and 
activities for unplanned emergency engineering work on the line, such as when track 
or infrastructure has been damaged or has suddenly degraded) and ending track 
possession (the reversal of the processes and activities for planned maintenance). 
 
National Grid Transco own, maintain and operate the high voltage electricity 
transmission system in England and Wales.  This complex and distributed system is 
comprised of 4500 miles of overhead lines, 410 miles of underground cables and 341 
substations.  The scenarios under analysis were observed at the Network Operations 
Centre (NOC) control room and in a number of geographically remote substations.  
There were three main parties involved in an outage scenario, a party working at 
Substation A on the Substation B circuit, a party working at Substation B on the 
Substation A circuit (i.e., at either end of a 30 mile overhead line) and an overhead 
line party working in between the two Substations. A return to service scenario was 
also observed.  The scenario also involved a circuit between substations and the 
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National Grid Transco Network Operations Centre.  The scenario under analysis 
involved the return from isolation of the circuit where the observation focussed upon 
six main parties that were involved and the complex technological infrastructure that 
facilitated remote operations and communication. 
 
2.3.  Armed Services 
All three armed services were analysed for command and control applications: army. 
air-force and navy. 
 
The study of command and control in the Army took place at the Command And Staff 
Training (CAST) exercises at the British Army’s Land Warfare Centre in Warminster 
Observations of both Brigade Headquarters and Battle Group Headquarters were 
undertaken.  The studies were focused on the planning process, known as the Combat 
Estimate, war-gaming and simulation of the enactment of the plan.  The plan is 
considered adequate when it meets the commander's intent, provides clear guidance to 
all sub-units and enough detail to allow the effects of the available combat power to 
be synchronised at critical points (Command and Staff Procedures, 2005).  Flexibility 
is described in terms of the agility and versatility required to respond to the situation 
(and enemy) as events occur.  Timeliness, finally, is about ensuring that there is 
'sufficient' time for the battle procedure to be enacted.  The Combat Estimate is 
summed up (and often referred to) as the seven questions.  These questions break 
down the process by which plans are made and actions taken; they summarise the 
activities and outcomes of the different stages of the process.   
 
The scenario analysed in the RAF took place on board an E3D AWACS (Airborne 
Warning and Control System) aircraft and covers the operations for a simulated war 
exercise. For more information, see Stewart et al (this volume). 
 
The Royal Navy allowed a team of researchers access to one of their training 
establishments - the Maritime Warfare School – on HMS Dryad in Southwick, 
Hampshire.  Observations were made during Command Team Training (CTT).  This 
programme involved training  the Command Team of a warship in the skills which 
would be necessary for them to defend their ship in a multi-threat environment, 
“assimilate, interpret and respond correctly to the information received from external 
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sources while reporting, directing and managing their and other units in the joint 
conduct of maritime operations” (Hoyle, 2001,p3). The training programme was 
conducted in a representative Type 23 Ship ‘Operations Room Simulator’ (ORS).  
The simulator room is slightly enlarged to allow for staff observation but otherwise 
was to scale (Hoyle, 2001). In addition to this simulator room there was a room which 
included a team of personnel who helped make any threats seem more realistic, i.e. 
they portrayed other ships and aircraft as well as personnel from other parts of the 
ship.  Three scenarios (air threat, subsurface threat and surface threat) were observed 
for this report. The Anti-Air Warfare Officer (AAWO) was the main agent observed 
in the air threat scenario and the (Principal Warfare Officer) PWO was the main agent 
observed for the subsurface and surface threat scenarios.  Other agents were heard 
and seen interacting with either the AAWO or the PWO.  
 
2.4.  Common features of the domains and application of command and control 
Despite the differences in the domains, the command and control applications share 
many common features.  First, they are typified by the presence of a central, remote, 
control room.  Data from the field are sent to displays and/or paper records about the 
events as they unfold over time.  Second, there is (currently) considerable reliance on 
the transmission of verbal messages between the field and the central control room.  
These messages are used to transmit report and command instructions.  Third, a good 
deal of the planning activities occurs in the central control room, which are then 
transmitted to the field.  There are collaborative discussions between the central 
control room and agents in the field on changes to the plan in light of particular 
circumstances found in-situ.  Finally, the activities tend to be a mixture of proactive 
command instructions and reactive control measures.  It is hypothesised that one of 
the determinants of the success or failure of a command and control systems will be 
the degree to which both the remote control centre and agents in-the field can achieve 
shared situational understanding about factors such as: reports of events in the field, 
command intent, plans, risks, resource capability, and instructions.  This places a 
heavy reliance on the effectiveness of the communications and media between the 
various parties in the command and control system. 
 
3.  Development of a Generic Task Model of Command and Control 
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Analysis of the task analyses from these three domains led to the development of a 
taxonomy of command and control activities, as indicated in table one.  The resultant 
data from the observational studies and task analyses were subject to content analysis, 
in order to pick out clusters of activities.  These clusters were subjected to thematic 
analysis consistent with a ‘grounded theory’ approach to data-driven research.  It was 
possible to allocate most of the tasks in the task analysis to one of these categories.  
To this extent, the building of a generic model of command and control was driven by 
the data from the observations and task analyses. 
 
Table 1.  Taxonomy of command and control activities 
 
TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
The detailed taxonomies may be found in the following seven tables, numbered two to 
eight.  The ‘receive’ taxonomy, as shown in table two, identifies activities that are 
associated with receiving orders, requests, data and information that relate to past, 
present or future events.  This information can act as a trigger for new command and 
control tasks, or modifications of ongoing tasks.  Thus the information may be either 
feed-forward or feedback. 
 
Table 2.  The ‘receive’ activities taxonomy  
 
TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
 
The ‘planning’ taxonomy, as shown in table three, describes all of the activities 
associated with the preparation, assessment and choice of the plan.  These activities 
include gathering of information, assessing options, discussing effects and prioritising 
alternative courses of action. 
 
Table 3.  The ‘planning’ activities taxonomy 
 
TABLE THREE ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
The ‘rehearsal’ taxonomy, as shown in table four, identifies activities that are 
associated with rehearsal of the plan prior to implementation.  Most of the domains 
discuss the plan with the other parties, with the exception of ATC.  The army also run 
a war-game on a map to consider the synchronisation of potential effects and likely 
courses of enemy responses. 
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Table 4.  The ‘rehearsal’ activities taxonomy 
 
TABLE FOUR ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
The ‘communicate’ taxonomy, as shown in table five, refers to all of the activities 
associated with remote communication from the control centre.  When the plan is 
communicated verbally, there is a read-out and read-back procedure, which may also 
act as a verbal rehearsal, although it does not formally belong in the ‘rehearsal’ 
taxonomy. 
 
Table 5.  The ‘communicate’ activities taxonomy 
 
TABLE FIVE ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
The ‘request’ taxonomy, as shown in table six, refers to manner in which the 
command and control centre asks for information and support from other parties.  
This includes agents in the field, other agencies, and other personnel in the command 
centre. 
 
Table 6.  The ‘request’ activities taxonomy 
 
TABLE SIX ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
The ‘monitor’ taxonomy, as shown in table seven, refers to all of the activities 
associated with keeping track of the changing situation and events being performed 
remotely.  These activities include recording any changes to the plan as they occur. 
 
Table 7.  The ‘monitor’ activities taxonomy 
 
TABLE SEVEN ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
The ‘review’ taxonomy, as shown in table eight, refers to all of the activities 
associated with an after-action review of the successful and less successful aspects of 
the activities.  This includes formal procedures, informal records, incident reports, and 
accident tribunals.  The armed forces tend to be very thorough in applying this 
analysis at the end of every engagement, whereas the civilian and emergency services 
tend to be more informal unless there is an accident or near miss.  
 
Table 8.  The ‘review’ activities taxonomy 
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TABLE EIGHT ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
From the taxonomies, and an analysis of the previous command and control models, it 
was possible to develop a generic process model, as shown in figure five.  
Construction of the model was driven by the data collected through observation from 
the different domains, and the subsequent thematic analysis and taxonomic 
development.  In the tradition of ‘grounded theory’ the generic command and control 
model was as a result of our observations, rather than an attempt to impose any 
preconceived ideas of command and control.  This may account for many of the 
differences in the current model developed in the course of the current research and 
those that have come before it. 
 
It is proposed that the command and control activities are triggered by events at the 
top of the figure, such as the receipt of orders of information, which provide a mission 
and a description of current situation of events in the field.  The gap between the 
mission and the current situation lead the command system to determine the effects 
that will narrow that gap.  This in turn requires the analysis of resources and 
constraints in the given situations.  From these activities plans are developed, 
evaluated and selected.  The chosen plans are then rehearsed before being 
communicated to agents in the field.  As the plan in enacted, feedback from the field 
is sought to check that events are unfolding as expected.  Changes to the mission or 
the events in the field may require the plan to be updated or revised.  When the 
mission has achieved the required effects, the current set of command and control 
activities may come to an end. 
 
The model in figure five distinguishes between ‘command’ activities, in the shaded 
triangle on the left-hand side of the figure, and ‘control’ activities, in the shaded 
triangle on the right-hand side of the figure.  Command comprises proactive, mission-
driven, planning and co-ordination activities.  Control comprises reactive, event-
driven, monitoring and communication activities.  The former implies the transfer of 
mission intent whereas the latter implies reaction to specific situations. 
 
FIGURE FIVE ABOUT HERE PLEASE 
 
Figure 5.  Generic process model of command and control. 
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As the process model is derived from the analysis of the three different domains, it 
should also explain the activities that go on in each of them.   
 
In the military domain, such as the army, the scenario begins with orders from a 
higher level in the command chain.  These orders form the mission that has to be 
turned into a plan.  The plan starts as an outline of the required effects on a map.  
These effects have to be turned into alternative courses of action that would result in 
the required effects, taking any intelligence of what the enemy is doing into account.  
Each of the courses of action is evaluated in terms of the resources required and 
possible risks.  The most optimal plan is selected, although alternative courses of 
action are kept in reserve.  The plan is rehearsed though a war gaming exercise and 
then communicated to the assets in the field, who might have to undertake lower level 
planning to meet their mission. If all levels of the organisation are content with the 
plan then it is put into action.  Regular field reports are requested and the effects of 
the changing situation are fed-back to check if events are unfolding as anticipated.  
Deviations from planned events may require more planning to determine if changes in 
the course of action are required.  Changes in the plan are fed-up and down the 
command chain.  When the mission objectives have been achieved, the scenario ends. 
 
In the emergency services domain, such as the fire service, the scenario begins with 
an emergency call from a member of the public, or from another emergency service.  
As much information as possible about the event it recorded, so that preliminary 
planning may be undertaken.  Templates plans for different types of event can be 
applied, such as ‘Domestic House Fire’, ‘Road Traffic Accident, and ‘Chemical 
Tanker Spillage’.  This can operate as a means of guiding the initial responses to the 
emergency, and getting the right kind of vehicles, equipment and people to the event.  
If the event turns out to be as expected, much of the incident planning can be left to 
the field operative, such as determining the appropriate course of action and 
implementing the plan.  Feedback to central command will confirm this.  If the event 
turns out to be more extensive or different to that anticipated, then details of the 
scenario may have to be fed back to central command and the plan worked out there 
first.  Then the chosen course of action will be communicated to the assets in the field 
and regular reports requested to check that the effects are as anticipated.  If new 
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situation come to light, then new courses of action may have to be planned for.  More 
complex incidents may require multi-agency cooperation, which will also be managed 
from central command.  When all danger is removed from the situation and the 
incident is cleaned up, the scenario may be ended. 
 
In the civilian domain, such as ATC, the scenario begins with receipt of a call from an 
aircraft to request for clearance to enter specified airspace.  The mission objectives are 
overarching for all scenarios, such as the safe and efficient transport of aircraft within 
and between sectors.  There are rules for aircraft separation and set procedures if this 
separation is compromised.  An aircraft may request a descent so that it can land at an 
airport.  The ATCO has to assess the effects and risks, and determine a sequence of 
actions that will achieve the desired outcome.  The exact set of actions will be 
affected by a number of factors, such as the workload of the ATCO, weather 
conditions, and number of aircraft and complexity of airspace.  The ATCO will, in 
effect, mentally anticipate the likely outcome of the planned actions for the aircraft in 
question and those in the near airspace.  The chosen course of action will be written 
onto the flight strip and communicated to the pilot.  The rules require a read-back for 
every instruction given.  The ATCO will monitor the progress of the aircraft, to check 
that the pilot is progressing as planned.  If the aircraft does not appear to be making 
progress, the ATCO will request a situation update from the pilot.  The scenario ends 
when the aircraft leaves the sector being monitored by the ATCO. 
 
Thus it is possible to use this model to explain some of the complexity of different 
command and control domains. 
 
4.  Conclusions 
The generic process model of command and control developed in the course of the 
research appears to have some differences to those models considered earlier.   The 
four models presented were Lawson’s (1981) control theoretic model, Hollnagel’s  
(1993) control modes model, Rasmussen (1974) and Vicente’s (1999) decision ladder 
model, and Smalley’s (2003) functional command and control model. 
 
The model in figure five contains all of the information processing activities within 
Lawson’s model (shown in figure one), but with greater fidelity and relevance to 
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command and control activities.  There is no explicit representation of a ‘desired 
state’ in the newer model (see figure four); rather this is expressed in terms of 
‘required effects’ which may be open to change in light of changes in the mission or 
events in the world.  It is also worth noting that the ‘desired state’ remains static in 
Lawson’s model, which is a weakness of the approach. 
 
Whilst much of the command and control activities are implicitly listed in Hollnagel’s 
model (shown in figure two) under ‘goals’, ‘plans’, ‘execution’ and ‘events’, the new 
model makes all of these activities explicit (see figure four).  The model does not 
indicate the effects of temporal change on the command and control activities.  The 
model does however distinguish between the proactive ‘command’ activities and the 
reactive ‘control’ activities.  It is probable that in higher tempo situations the 
command and control system is more likely to be in a reactive mode (i.e., the right-
hand side of figure five).  Conversely, it is probable that in lower tempo situations the 
command and control system is more likely to be in a proactive mode of operation 
(i.e., the left-hand side of figure five). 
 
The new activities model in figure five does not attempt to distinguish between 
knowledge and system states in the way that Rasmussen and Vicente’s decision ladder 
model does.  The decision ladder model has the inherent flexibility of shortcuts 
(which the analyst is required to identify), which can be used to indicate different 
levels of expertise.  This makes the decision ladder model a better explanation of 
individual behaviour, but less applicable to the description of the activities in a 
command and control system.  The generic decision ladder model could be used to 
describe any system, but it lacks the fidelity of Smalley’s model for command and 
control.  The decision ladder model does not attempt to distinguish between command 
and control activities, nor proactive and reactive behaviour. 
 
As with Smalley’s model (shown in figure four), the new model (see figure five) does 
distinguish between ‘command’ activities and ‘control’ activities, and between 
‘internal’ and ‘external’ co-ordination.  The new model does not attempt to 
distinguish between ‘information processing’ and ‘decision support’ functions, 
primarily as the purpose of the generic model was to remain independent of 
technology and allocation of function.  As with Smalley’s model, the newer model 
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also has a high degree to fidelity with regard to the command and control activities.  
This was seen as a strength of both of the models.  Whereas Smalley’s model was 
based solely on military command and control the newer model was based on a 
broader domain base.  Both models provide a basis for research investigations into 
command and control activities. 
 
Given the various models above, the relatively invariant properties of command and 
control scenarios can be distilled down to a basic descriptive level as a scenario 
possessing: 
 
• a common overall goal (comprised of different but interacting sub-goals), 
• individuals and teams coordinating to reach it, but 
• dispersed geographically, and there are 
• numerous systems, procedures and technology to support their endeavour 
(Walker et al., 2006). 
 
Beyond the descriptive level, command and control by definition is a collection of 
functional parts that together form a functioning whole.  Command and control is a 
mixture of people and technology, typically dispersed geographically.  It is a 
purposeful intelligently adaptive endeavour representing progress towards a defined 
outcome.  Intelligent adaptation requires responses to externally generated input 
events within a finite and specified period (Young, 1982).  In possessing these 
attributes, command and control can be characterised with reference to, and 
understood from the following modelling perspectives, as: 
 
• An (open) system of interacting parts, 
• A socio technical system of human and non-human agents and artefacts, 
• A distributed system, 
• A real time system, and 
• an intelligent system. 
 
There are numerous modelling challenges underlying command and control and the 
attributes above.  Foremost is that the, “real world is made from open, interacting 
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systems, behaving chaotically” (Hitchins, 2000), and in the case of human actors, 
non-linearly.  Complex systems like command and control scenarios also possess 
various real-time properties that cannot be considered ‘designed’ as such, they 
sometimes merely ‘happen’ (Hitchins, 2000).  Therefore the notion of a commander 
representing something akin to the conductor of an orchestra is in some cases entirely 
false (Hitchins, 2000).  Also, unlike clearly linear systems, the possibility exists for 
there to be no clear boundaries between certain system elements, as well as no 
beginning and no end, given that goals are more or less externally adaptive.  Within 
this, the concept of situational awareness arises as a “necessary component in 
achieving decision superiority” (p. 28), and one of the key emergent properties from 
any command and control scenario (DoD, 1999).  Added to the previous challenges, 
in virtually anything other than the physical sciences a theory such as situational 
awareness is more akin to, “a general principle or a collection of interrelated general 
principles that is put forward as an explanation of a set of known facts and empirical 
findings” (Reber, 1995, p. 793).  Thus the modelling of a generic command and 
control system as an entity is very challenging; as this is a complex social-technical 
environment that aims to promulgate a shared situational understanding across 
dispersed geographical locations, using various technical and communications media.   
 
By conducting observations across several domains, the aim of this work has been to 
develop a generic framework for command and control. In order to progress this into 
a coherent theory, the next phase of the work is to explore how the various domains 
perform operations within each heading and to ask how the removal or disruption of 
activity under a heading will impair performance within a given domain. An approach 
to this would be to employ the WESTT (workload, error, situational awareness, time 
and teamwork) modelling tool (Houghton et al., this volume).  
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Table 1.  Taxonomy of command and control activities 
 
 
 
 
Category Table No. Definition of activities 
Receive 2 Receipt of data or information, a request or an order 
Plan 3 Planning activities and planning decisions 
Rehearse 4 Rehearsal of plan prior to action 
Communicate 5 Transfer of verbal, written or pictorial information 
Request 6 Request for data and information or assistance 
Monitor 7 Monitoring and recording of effects of plan 
implementation 
Review 8 Reviewing the effectiveness of plans or actions 
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Table 2.  The ‘receive’ activities taxonomy  
 
 
 
 
Domains Emergency 
Services 
Civilian Services Armed Services 
 Receive        
taxonomy 
Police Fire NATS NGT NR Army Navy Air 
Incoming calls                 
Paper message                 
Face to face                 
Diary of work                 
Incoming alarms                 
Identity exchange                 
Live displays                 
 Pre planned/pre-
defined activities 
                
Database         
Handover         
Procedures/systems 
(implicit comms) 
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Table 3.  The ‘planning’ activities taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
Domains Emergency 
Services 
Civilian Services Armed Services 
 Planning  
 taxonomy 
Police Fire NATS NGT NR Army Navy Air 
Review of location of 
assets 
                
Establish status of 
assets and resources 
                
Request status of 
current activities 
                
Gather information 
(site, intel, environs) 
                
Integrate information                 
Get people to site                 
Develop mission 
timings 
                
Identify areas of 
interests 
                
Identify decision points                 
Undertake 
environmental analysis 
                
Determine options 
(own and enemy) 
                
Identify potential 
conflicts 
                
Identify tactics (own 
and enemy) 
                
Check if information is 
sufficient 
                
Consult other parties                 
Discuss effects                 
Assess options                 
Select between 
alternative plans 
                
Assign assets to tasks                 
Assess risks with plan                 
Communicate plan to 
other parties 
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Table 4.  The ‘rehearsal’ activities taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
 
Domains Emergency 
Services 
Civilian Services Armed Services 
 Rehearsal 
taxonomy 
Police Fire NATS NGT NR Army Navy Air 
Discuss plan 
verbally 
                
Move assets on 
map to rehearse 
plan 
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Table 5.  The ‘communicate’ activities taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
Domains Emergency 
Services 
Civilian Services Armed Services 
 Communicate 
taxonomy 
Police Fire NATS NGT NR Army Navy Air 
Exchange identities                 
Issue instructions/orders                 
Read-back instructions                 
Confirm read-back                 
Record date and time of 
instructions 
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Table 6.  The ‘request’ activities taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
Domains Emergency 
Services 
Civilian Services Armed Services 
  Request 
taxonomy 
Police Fire NATS NGT NR Army Navy Air 
Request status 
from personnel 
                
Request 
information from 
other parties 
                
Pass information 
onto other parties 
                
Request additional 
resources or assets
                
Request support 
from other 
services 
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Table 7.  The ‘monitor’ activities taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
 Domains Emergency 
Services 
Civilian Services Armed Services 
 Monitor 
taxonomy 
Police Fire NATS NGT NR Army Navy Air 
Track assets 
(and enemy) 
                
Identify 
conflicts with 
plan 
                
Allocate 
resource and 
assets to tasks 
                
Control 
resources and 
assets 
                
Record 
changes to 
plan 
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Table 8.  The ‘review’ activities taxonomy 
 
 
 
 
Domains Emergency 
Services 
Civilian Services Armed Services 
  Review taxonomy Police Fire NATS NGT NR Army Navy Air 
Effectiveness of 
actions 
                
Deviation from plan                 
Key decision points                 
Internal updates and 
reports 
                
Loss of situation 
awareness 
                
Lessons learnt                 
 
 
 
 
